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Abstract—Hybrid systems model checking is a great success in guaranteeing the safety of computerized control cyber-physical
systems (CPS). However, when applying hybrid systems model checking to Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MDPnP) CPS, we
encounter two challenges due to the complexity of human body: i) there are no good ofﬂine differential equation based models for many
human body parameters; ii) the complexity of human body can result in many variables, complicating the system model. In an attempt to
address the challenges, we propose to alter the traditional approach of ofﬂine hybrid systems model checking of time-unbounded (i.e.,
inﬁnite-horizon, a.k.a., long-run) future behavior to online hybrid systems model checking of time-bounded (i.e., ﬁnite-horizon, a.k.a.,
short-run) future behavior. According to this proposal, online model checking runs as a real-time task to prevent faults. To meet the
real-time requirements, certain design patterns must be followed, which brings up the co-design issue. We propose two sets of system
co-design patterns for hard real-time and soft real-time respectively. To evaluate our proposals, a case study on laser tracheotomy
MDPnP is carried out. The study shows the necessity of online model checking. Furthermore, test results based on real-world human
subject trace show the feasibility and effectiveness of our proposed co-design.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
T
HANKS to the rapid development of embedded systems
technology, we now have thousands of kinds of embedded
medical devices. So far, these devices are mainly designed for
isolated use. However, people envision that by coordinating
these devices, we can signiﬁcantly increase medical treatment
safety, capability, and efﬁciency. This vision led to the launch
of the Medical Device Plug-and-Play (MDPnP) [1] effort,
which aims to enable the safe composition and collabora-
tion of disparate embedded devices in medical contexts. An
MDPnP system is a typical Cyber-Physical System (CPS) [2].
On the one hand, it involves cyber-world discrete computer
logic of various embedded medical devices. On the other
hand, it involves physical-world patient-in-the-loop, which is
a continuous complex biochemical system.
The top concern of any MDPnP system is safety. In the
cyber-world, for a safety-critical system, people often carry
out model checking [3] before the system is put online. In
such case, model checking builds an ofﬂine model of the
system, and checks the system’s possible behaviors in the time-
unbounded future (i.e., inﬁnite-horizon). Only after passing
model checking may the system be allowed to run.
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This practice is a great success. For CPS veriﬁcation, the
state-of-the-art model checking tools are the hybrid systems
model checking tools [4][5], which integrate the discrete
automata models with the continuous differential equation (and
other control theory) models. Today, hybrid systems model
checking can already analyze many computerized control
systems, i.e., control CPS.
The success of hybrid model checking in control CPS
inspires the interest to apply it in MDPnP CPS. However,
this faces a major challenge: in most MDPnP CPS, there are
no good ofﬂine models to describe the complex biochemical
system of the patient [6]. Even if some vital signs can be
modeled ofﬂine, the models may not (with some exceptions
[7]) ﬁt into existing hybrid systems model checking tools,
which mainly use linear differential equations to describe the
physical world.
To deal with the above challenges, we propose to alter
the traditional practice of ofﬂine model checking of hybrid
system’s behavior in the inﬁnite-horizon. Instead, we carry
out periodical online model checking. In every period, we
only model check the hybrid system’s behavior in the next
(few) period(s); i.e., we only model check the hybrid system’s
behavior in time-bounded future (i.e., ﬁnite-horizon).
The merits of the proposed approach are as follows. First,
though many human body parameters are hard to model
ofﬂine, their online behaviors in ﬁnite-horizon are quite pre-
dictable. For example, after injecting 1ml of morphine, it is
hard to accurately predict the blood oxygen level curve in
the next 40 minutes, as it depends on too many factors, even
including the patient’s emotion [8][9]. However, it is easy toIEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 2
predict the blood oxygen level curve in the next 4 seconds:
it cannot plunge from 100% to 10%, nor show a saw-toothed
wave form; instead, it has to be smooth, which can be effec-
tively described with existing tools, such as linear regression.
Also, within short ﬁnite-horizon, we can approximate many
variables as constants, and/or approximate nonlinear behaviors
as linear behaviors. This would further simplify our model and
computation.
The proposed approach can be formalized as follows. Given
an MDPnP system S, we periodically sample the observ-
able state parameters every T seconds. At time instance kT
(k = 0,1,2,...), we build a hybrid system model (i.e., the
“online model”) of S with the observed numerical values of
state parameters, and verify its safety in the time interval
[kT,(k + 1)T]. We hence call T the ﬁnite-horizon of our
online model checking. If the online model is proven safe, the
system can run for another T seconds. Otherwise, the system
immediately switches to an application dependant fall-back
plan.
Such model checking must ﬁnish within bounded and short
time, i.e. real-time, to allow decision making (on whether
to run the system for another T seconds or switch to fall-
back plan) before any fault happens. To support real-time, the
MDPnP CPS design must follow certain patterns, which brings
up the issue of hybrid systems model checking and CPS co-
design.
In the rest of the paper, we discuss our proposed co-design
approach through the context of laser tracheotomy, a repre-
sentative MDPnP application [7][10]. Section 2 introduces
the background on hybrid systems model checking; Section 3
proposes our online hybrid systems modeling approach; Sec-
tion 4 proposes the corresponding system design patterns;
Section 5 evaluates our approach; Section 6 further examines
our proposal under relaxed assumptions; Section 7 discusses
related work; and Section 8 concludes the paper.
This paper is based on our previous conference paper pub-
lished in [11], which is in turn based on our workshop paper
published in [12][13]. Compared to these previous versions,
this paper mainly added Section 4.1, Theorem 3, Section 6.2,
and the supplementary ﬁle.
2 BACKGROUND
Hybrid systems model checking is ﬁrst proposed by Alur,
Henzinger, et al. [14][15][16] and has since evolved into a
family of state-of-the-art tools in CPS. The main idea is to
combine the discrete automata models of computer logic with
continuous differential equation models of control systems,
which leads to the modeling tool of hybrid automata.
2.1 Syntax
Following [15]’s conventions on symbols, a
hybrid automaton A is syntactically a tuple of
A = (  x,  x0,V,v0,inv,dif,E,act,L,syn), where
  x is a vector of n data variables   x = (x1,x2,...,xn).   x
is regarded as a function of time, and we use   ˙ x to denote the
ﬁrst order derivative of   x. We also use   x′ = (x′
1,x′
2,...,x′
n) to
denote the new values of   x after an event (see the deﬁnitions
for E and act). A speciﬁc evaluation of   x, denoted as   s =
(s1,s2,...,sn) ∈ Rn is called a data state of A. In addition,
Boolean values of true and false can be denoted with real
number 1 and 0 respectively; hence a data variable can also
serve as a Boolean variable.
  x0 is the initial data state.
V is a set of locations, a.k.a., control locations, where
different control laws apply. Each location corresponds to a
vertex in the graphical representation of hybrid automaton A.
A state of hybrid automaton A is denoted as (v,  s), where
v ∈ V and   s ∈ Rn is a data state.
v0 is the initial location.
inv is the location invariants, a function that assigns each
location v ∈ V a set of inequalities over data variables   x. That
is, when in location v, the value of   x must satisfy inv(v).
dif is the continuous activities, a function that assigns
each location v ∈ V a set of inequalities over   ˙ x and   x. That
is, when in location v, the values of   ˙ x and   x must satisfy
dif(v).
E is the set of events, a.k.a. transitions: edges between
locations. Formally, E ⊆ V ×V . For an event e = (v,v′) ∈ E,
v is the source location and v′ is the target location.
act is the discrete actions, a function assigns to each
event e = (v,v′) ∈ E a set of inequalities over   x and   x′,
where   x′ = (x′
1,x′
2,...,x′
n) refers to the new value of   x
after event e. The event e = (v,v′) is enabled only when the
value of   x in v satisﬁes act(e), and the new value of   x′ after
the event is chosen nondeterministically such that act(e) is
satisﬁed. For example, suppose   x = (x1), then for act(e) =
(x1 ≤ 3 ∧ x′
1 ≤ 5 ∧ x′
1 ≥ 5), event e is only enabled when
x1 ≤ 3; and after the event, x1 is assigned the new value of 5.
Like this example, if   x and   x′ do not mix in any inequalities
in act(e), and   x′ has a deterministic value   s′, then we can call
the subset of inequalities involving only   x to be the guard of
event e, and event e updates   x to   s′, denoted as   x :=   s′.
L is a set of synchronization labels.
syn is the synchronization function that assigns each
event e ∈ E an l ∈ L. L and syn are for composition
of multiple hybrid automata. Suppose we have two hybrid
automata A1 = (  x1,  x0
1,V1,v0
1,inv1,dif1,E1,act1,L1,syn1)
and A2 = (  x2,  x0
2,V2,v0
2,inv2,dif2,E2,act2,L2,syn2), if
e1 ∈ E1, e2 ∈ E2 and syn1(e1) = syn2(e2), then event
e1 and e2 must always take place together.
Furthermore, when inv, dif, and act only involve linear
inequalities, and dif does not involve   x, hybrid automaton A
is called linear hybrid automaton (LHA)[14].
Reference [15] also describes how to combine several
hybrid automata into one hybrid automaton. Particularly, the
location set of the combined hybrid automaton Vcomb =
V1×V2×...×Vn, where Vi (i = 1,...,n) is the location set
of the ith component hybrid automaton; and “×” is Cartesian
product. For v ∈ Vcomb, we use v|i to denote the projection
of v on Vi.
2.2 Semantics
This paper adopts the semantic concepts and the corresponding
symbol deﬁnitions of [15]. Due to page limit, interestedIEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 3
readers shall refer to [15] for these deﬁnitions. Of particular
importance are the concepts of state predicate, trajectory,
number of hops (of a trajectory), non-blocking, non-zeno.
We, however, want to emphasize that to simplify narration,
in the following, unless explicitly denoted, “model checking”
refers to “model checking of ﬁnite-horizon reachability seman-
tics”, i.e., whether a state σ of hybrid automaton A satisﬁes
ϕ1∃U≤Tϕ2, where ϕ1 and ϕ2 are state predicates of A, and T
is the ﬁnite-horizon. Also, unless explicitly denoted, we only
discuss non-blocking hybrid automata.
3 HYBRID SYSTEMS MODELING APPROACH
In this section, we shall use laser tracheotomy, a representative
MDPnP application [7][10], as the context to discuss the
proper hybrid systems modeling approach for MDPnP. We
shall see through this case study why ofﬂine model checking
must be replaced by online model checking.
Laser tracheotomy MDPnP interlocks various medical de-
vices to increase safety. It has the following entities (see
Fig. 1):
Patient: the patient that receives the surgery;
O2 Sensor: the patient’s trachea oxygen level sensor;
SpO2 Sensor: the patient’s blood oxygen level sensor;
Ventilator: the medical device that administrates the patient’s
respirations;
Surgeon: the doctor that conducts the surgery;
Laser Scalpel: the medical device for the surgeon to cut the
patient’s trachea;
Supervisor: the central computer that connects all medical
devices and makes decisions to guarantee safety.
Fig. 1. Layout of Laser Tracheotomy MDPnP
The application context is as follows. In the surgery, due
to general anesthesia, the patient is paralyzed, hence has to
depend on the ventilator to breathe. The ventilator has three
modes: pumping out (the patient inhales oxygen), pumping in
(the patient exhales), and hold (the patient exhales naturally
due to chest weight). However, when the laser scalpel is to cut
the patient’s trachea, the oxygen level inside the trachea must
be lower than a threshold. Otherwise, the laser may trigger ﬁre.
Therefore, before the laser scalpel is allowed to emit laser,
the ventilator must have stopped pumping out (oxygen) for
a while. On the other hand, the ventilator can neither stop
pumping out for too long, or the patient will suffocate due to
too low blood oxygen level.
In summary, the laser tracheotomy MDPnP must avoid the
following safety hazards:
Safety Hazard 1: when the laser scalpel emits laser, the
patient’s trachea oxygen level exceeds a threshold ΘO2;
Safety Hazard 2: the patient’s blood oxygen level reaches
below a threshold ΘSpO2.
Note that the setting of constant thresholds ΘO2 and ΘSpO2 are
medical experts’ responsibility and are beyond the coverage of
this paper.
The formal expressions of safety hazards will become clear
by the end of Section 3.2, when the corresponding hybrid
automata are deﬁned.
3.1 Traditional Approach: Ofﬂine Modeling
Because the laser tracheotomy MDPnP involves both discrete
medical device logic and physical world patient, it is a hybrid
system. Therefore we try to model laser tracheotomy MDPnP
with hybrid automata.
The traditional approach of model checking, including
hybrid systems model checking, is carried out ofﬂine. That
is, the model is built and its inﬁnite-horizon behavior is
veriﬁed before the system runs. We choose to start with this
approach. As a common practice, our ofﬂine modeling of laser
tracheotomy MDPnP assumes a global time t: t is initialized
to 0 second, and ˙ t ≡ 1.
Intuitively, we intend to start with modeling the patient, the
core entity of the laser tracheotomy MDPnP. However, the
patient’s behavior is directly administrated by the ventilator,
which has to be understood ﬁrst.
Fig. 2. Ofﬂine hybrid automaton of Ventilator
The ventilator is basically a compressible air reservoir [17]:
a cylinder of height Hvent(t) (0 ≤ Hvent(t) ≤ 0.3(m)). The
movement of the ventilator cylinder (indicated by ˙ Hvent(t))
pumps out/in oxygen/air to/from patient, thus helping the pa-
tient to inhale/exhale. The ventilator behavior is deﬁned by the
hybrid automaton in Fig. 2. The automaton has three locations:
PumpOut, PumpIn, and Hold. When the supervisor (will be
discussed later in Fig. 8) allows the ventilator to work (i.e.,
when data variable LaserApprove is set to false), the ventila-
tor switches between pumping out (where ˙ Hvent = −0.1m/s)
and pumping in (where ˙ Hvent = +0.1m/s). This causes the
patient to inhale oxygen and exhale respectively. When theIEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 4
supervisor pauses the ventilator (i.e., when LaserApprove is
set to true), the ventilator cylinder will try to restore to its
maximum height (0.3m) and holds there until the ventilator is
allowed again (LaserApprove set to false).
Fig. 3. Ofﬂine hybrid automaton of Patient. Though good ofﬂine
models for ˙ O2 exists [7], the ofﬂine model for ˙ SpO2 is still an open
problem. Also note that in location Hold (which corresponds to ventilator
Hold), the patient still exhale due to chest weight.
With the ventilator hybrid automaton at hand, we can now
start modeling the patient. The patient hybrid automaton (see
Fig. 3) is tightly coupled with the ventilator hybrid automaton
(see Fig. 2). It also has three locations: Inhale, Exhale, and
Hold, which respectively correspond to the ventilator hybrid
automaton’s locations of PumpOut, PumpIn, and Hold. The
events between the three locations are also triggered by
corresponding events from the ventilator hybrid automaton.
Inside of each location are the ofﬂine continuous time
models for trachea oxygen level O2(t) and blood oxygen
level SpO2(t). Unfortunately, though there are good ofﬂine
models for ˙ O2(t) [7], the ofﬂine model for ˙ SpO2(t) is still
an open problem [8][9]. This is because blood oxygen level
are strongly affected by complex human body biochemical
reactions, even emotions.
Therefore, we fail to model SpO2(t) ofﬂine, and hence
fail to model the patient ofﬂine. What is worse, as the
patient model is an indispensable component of the holistic
ofﬂine model, the ofﬂine model checking of laser tracheotomy
MDPnP fails.
3.2 Proposed Approach: Online Modeling
The failure of ofﬂine approach forces us to consider the
proposed online approach (see Section 1) instead. Speciﬁcally,
we sample the patient’s trachea/blood oxygen level every T
seconds. Suppose at t0 = kT (k ∈ Z≥0), we get the most
up-to-date trachea/blood oxygen level sensor reading c O2(t0)
and   SpO2(t0), we can then build the hybrid systems model
for interval [t0,t0+T], where T is therefore the ﬁnite-horizon.
This model is built as follows.
First, same as the ofﬂine model checking, we use global
variable t to represent the global clock, except that now t is
initialized to t0 and stops at (t0 + T) as we only care about
the system’s ﬁnite-horizon safety until (t0 + T).
The patient hybrid automaton now looks like Fig. 4(a). The
biggest change is the continuous time model for the blood
oxygen level SpO2(t). In ofﬂine model checking, we have to
describe the inﬁnite-horizon behavior of SpO2(t), which is an
(a) non-linear model
(b) linear hybrid automaton (LHA) model (see Section 2.1 for
deﬁnition of LHA), where c O2inhale, c O2exhale, and c O2hold are
constants, which can be estimated from historical data.
Fig. 4. Online hybrid automaton of Patient.
open problem. However, in online model checking, we only
have to describe SpO2(t)’s behavior in interval [t0,t0 + T],
where the ﬁnite-horizon T is just a few seconds. If we only
look into such short-run future, blood oxygen level curve
SpO2(t) is very describable and predictable. For example,
it cannot plunge from 100% to 10% within just 4 seconds,
neither can it show a saw-toothed wave form. Instead, it must
be smooth; in fact smooth enough to be safely predicted with
standard tools (such as linear regression) based on its past
history.
In Fig. 4(a), we use a simple way to predict/describe
SpO2(t) in t ∈ [t0,t0 + T]:
˙ SpO2(t) ≡ g ˙ SpO2(t0), ∀t ∈ [t0,t0 + T],
where ˙ SpO2(t) is the derivative of SpO2(t) at time t; and
g ˙ SpO2(t0) is the estimation (e.g., via linear regression) of
˙ SpO2(t0) based on SpO2(t)’s history recorded during (t0 −
Tpast,t0). Tpast is a conﬁguration constant picked empirically
ofﬂine. In our case study, we pick Tpast = 6 seconds.
Also, depending on the patient’s state at time t0, the initial
location can be Inhale, Exhale, or Hold. Whichever location
it is, the initial value of trachea/blood oxygen value should be
c O2(t0) and d SpO2(t0) respectively.
The patient model of Fig. 4(a) can be further simpliﬁed.
Human subject respiration traces (see Fig. 5) show that the
values of ainhale, aexhale, and ahold in Fig. 4(a) are large:
so large that O2(t) almost behaves as rectangular waves whenIEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 5
the patient hybrid automaton changes locations. Therefore, we
can simplify Fig. 4(a) into Fig. 4(b), where O2(t) remains
constant within every location, and its value is only updated
on the corresponding transitions. This simpliﬁcation turns the
patient hybrid automaton (in fact the whole system) into an
linear hybrid automaton (LHA) (see Section 2.1 for deﬁnition
of LHA), which is much easier to verify [18].
Fig. 5. A typical example excerpt of trachea CO2 level trace
(measured on human subjects with Nonin 9843 [19]); note O2(t) =
C1−C2·CO2(t), where C1 and C2 are two constants, whose derivation
can be found in classic physics textbooks [20].
We now check other laser tracheotomy MDPnP entities.
First, since the online model only looks into the ﬁnite-
horizon of [t0,t0 + T], where T is also the sensor sampling
period, there are no interactions with sensors throughout the
interval of (t0,t0 + T). Therefore, in online model checking,
the hybrid automata of O2 sensor and SpO2 sensor are
unnecessary.
Fig. 6. Online hybrid automaton of Ventilator.
Next, the ventilator hybrid automaton in online model (see
Fig. 6) is almost the same as its ofﬂine counterpart (see Fig. 2)
A main difference is that the online model’s initial location can
be any location depending on the ventilator’s state at t0.
The last entity that directly interacts with the patient is the
laser scalpel. We can actually model the laser scalpel and the
surgeon with one hybrid automaton: the laser scalpel hybrid
automaton (see Fig. 7).
The automaton’s key elements are the two Boolean vari-
ables: LaserApprove and LaserReq.
LaserApprove indicates whether the supervisor (see Fig. 1)
allows the laser scalpel to emit laser (true for yes and false
for no). Its value can only be set by the supervisor hybrid
automaton (see Fig. 8), which is to be explained later.
LaserReq indicates whether the laser scalpel wants to emit
laser (true for yes and false for no). Its value can only be
set by the laser scalpel hybrid automaton. The value setting is
Fig. 7. Online hybrid automaton of Laser Scalpel. This is the only
automaton that sets the value of state variable LaserReq.
triggered by following events: i) when in LaserIdle, the sur-
geon can request emitting laser through eventSurgeonRequest,
which sets LaserReq to true; ii) when in LaserRequesting
or LaserEmitting, the surgeon can request stopping laser
emission through eventSurgeonCancel and eventSurgeonStop
respectively, which both set LaserReq to false; iii) when in
LaserEmitting, the supervisor can stop the laser emission at
any time by setting LaserApprove to false, which triggers
eventSupervisorStop and sets LaserReq to false.
The four possible combinations of LaserApprove and
LaserReq’s values deﬁne the major locations in the
laser scalpel hybrid automaton: LaserIdle, LaserRequesting,
LaserEmitting, and LaserCanceling. Particularly, laser scalpel
emits laser in and only in LaserEmitting. There is an additional
location, LaserToEmit, which models the additional delay
Tmax
toemit between LaserRequesting and LaserEmitting. This
delay is to further ensure oxygen level in trachea falls below
threshold before the actual laser emission.
The laser scalpel hybrid automaton’s initial location can be
anywhere depending on the laser scalpel’s state at t0. One
thing to note is that all variables should be initialized to their
actual value at t0. For example, if initial location is LaserIdle,
and Laser Scalpel has been idling for 10 seconds by t0, then
tidle shall be initialized to 10 seconds instead of 0.
Finally, all medical device entities are interlocked by the
supervisor, the central decision making computer (see Fig. 1).
The supervisor maneuvers data variable LaserApprove. Set-
ting LaserApprove to true/false determines the off/on of
the ventilator and the permission/denial of emitting laser
respectively.
The value setting decisions are made dependent on the
most up-to-date information on the patient’s trachea oxygen
level O2(t) and blood oxygen level SpO2(t). Based on the
models given in the patient hybrid automaton (see Fig. 4),
we can predict O2(t) and SpO2(t) for any t ∈ [t0,t0 + T].
Therefore, we can construct the supervisor hybrid automaton
as Fig. 8, which directly uses O2(t) and SpO2(t) predicted
by the patient hybrid automaton for decision making.
The supervisor hybrid automaton has two locations:IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 6
Fig. 8. Online hybrid automaton of Supervisor. This is the only
automaton that sets the value of data variable LaserApprove. Note
tapprove can be totally removed from the model in soft real-time online
model checking.
LaserDisapproved and LaserApproved.
When in LaserDisapproved, the supervisor needs eventSu-
pervisorApprove to move to LaserApproved. This event is
triggered when the following prerequisites all hold:
Prerequisite 1: the laser scalpel is requesting emitting laser
(i.e., LaserReq = true);
Prerequisite 2: O2(t) is less than threshold ΘO2;
Prerequisite 3: SpO2(t) is greater than threshold ΘSpO2.
Prerequisite 4: tdisapprove ≥ Tmin
disapprove. This is a minimal
dwelling time requirement to guarantee the automaton’s non-
zeno property. The purpose will become clear in a latter
example (Example 1 of Appendix B in the supplementary
ﬁle). This requirement also models the time cost in switching
between LaserDisapproved and LaserApproved modes in the
supervisor.
Through eventSupervisorApprove, the supervisor approves
the emission of laser by setting LaserApprove to true. This
event also resets a clock tapprove, and moves the location to
LaserApproved.
Like tdisapprove, clock tapprove is for guaranteeing a mini-
mal dwelling time of Tmin
approve in LaserApproved. After that, if
Prerequisite 1 no longer holds (i.e., when LaserReq becomes
false), the eventNormalDisapprove is triggered. This event
moves the supervisor back to location LaserDisapproved and
resets LaserApprove to false, and tdisapprove to 0.
In contrast to eventNormalDisapprove,
eventAbnormalDisapprove is triggered when the supervisor
is in LaserApproved while Prerequisite 2 or 3 stops to
hold. This event also moves the supervisor back to location
LaserDisapproved and resets LaserApprove/tdisapprove to
false/0 respectively.
Finally, same as the other online hybrid automata, the initial
location for the online supervisor automaton can be either
LaserDisapproved or LaserApproved, depending on the state
of the supervisor at time t0; and the variables should be
initialized to the actual values at t0.
With the above hybrid automata model of the laser tra-
cheotomy MDPnP, we can formally express Safety Hazard 1
and 2 (see the beginning of Section 3) as follows.
Safety Hazard 1:For any given initial state σ0, σ0 |=
true∃U≤T
S
v∈Vcomp∧v|ls=LaserEmitting(v,O2(t) ≥ ΘO2);
Safety Hazard 2:For any given initial state σ0, σ0 |=
true∃U≤T
S
v∈Vcomp(v,SpO2(t) ≤ ΘSpO2);
where Vcomp is the location set of the combined automaton of
the Ventilator, Patient, Laser Scalpel, and Supervisor; v|ls is
v’s projection on the Laser Scalpel automaton location set.
When model checking any one of the above safety hazards,
a “yes” answer means the system is unsafe; while a “no”
answer means this system is safe.
4 SYSTEM CO-DESIGN PATTERN
The evolution from ofﬂine model checking to online model
checking must also be matched with system design changes.
4.1 Hard Real-Time System Design
First, the overall system architecture shall integrate online
model checking as a runtime fault prediction and prevention
mechanism.
A straightforward thought is to run online model checking
periodically. So far, we have assumed the period to be the
same as the online model checking’s ﬁnite-horizon T. That
is, at the beginning of each period T, online model checking
predicts whether unsafe states are reachable within the coming
T seconds. If so, the system switches to a fall-back plan for
the current period. The fall-back plan is application dependent.
For laser tracheotomy MDPnP, a simple fall-back plan is that
the supervisor locks LaserApprove at false, hence forbidding
laser emission and keeping the ventilator active.
The above overall architecture works if online model check-
ing costs 0 time. In practice, this is an over simpliﬁcation.
However, if the online model checking has a worst case
execution time bound D < T (where T is the online model
checking’s ﬁnite-horizon), then we can run the online model
checking as a hard real-time task and use pipelining to carry
out fault prediction and prevention. This is formally described
by the algorithm in Fig. 9, which, without loss of generality,
runs a pipeline with T = 2D; and D replaces T to be the new
sampling period.
//This code assumes online model checking (see line 4, 5) can always
//ﬁnish within hard real-time deadline D = T
2 .
1. main(){
2. wait till current time t satisﬁes (tmod T
2 = 0);
3. t0 := t;
4. read sensors and build online model A;
5. if (A may reach unsafe states in [t0,t0 + T]){
6. /*non-blocking call:*/ switch the hybrid system to fall-back plan;
7. }else
/*non-blocking call:*/ allow the hybrid system to run normally;
8. goto line 2;
9. }
Fig. 9. Overall system architecture for hard real-time online model
checking, with worst case execution time bound of D (for line 4, 5).
Without loss of generality, the code runs a pipeline with T = 2D (see
line 2, 5). To “run normally” means that the hybrid system runs according
to online model A’s (see line 4) descriptions.
To run the hard real-time algorithm of Fig. 9, the online
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cost upper bound must exist. In the following, we show a
large family of hybrid automata systems, strongly non-zeno
LHA systems (SNZ-LHA-Systems) [21] to be exact, satisfy
the decidability requirement.
Deﬁnition 1 (SNZ-LHA-System): Let S be a set of linear
hybrid automata (LHA). For each LHA A ∈ S, let
TA
def
= {τ|τ is a trajectory (see [15] for the deﬁnition of
“trajectory”) of A and τ passes a transition of A twice}.
If ∃ε > 0, such that ∀A ∈ S,inf∀τ∈TA{δτ} ≥ ε (where δτ
is τ’s duration; inf ∅
def
= ∞), then S is called a strongly
non-zeno LHA system (SNZ-LHA-System).
For an SNZ-LHA-System, we have the following:
Theorem 1 (Decidability): Finite-horizon reachability
model checking of an SNZ-LHA-System is decidable.
Proof: See Appendix A in the supplementary ﬁle. ￿
What is more, the proof of Theorem 1 also shows a time cost
upper bound for ﬁnite-horizon reachability model checking
of an SNZ-LHA-system exists. In fact, interested readers can
refer to [22] for a loose time cost upper bound, though a tight
time cost upper bound is still an open problem.
Therefore, if we ensure an online hybrid systems model to
be an SNZ-LHA-System, real-time worst case execution time
(i.e., deadline) exists.
Given a set S of LHAs, we claim in the following
that S is ensured to be an SNZ-LHA-System if it com-
plies with certain design patterns stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Decidable Design Pattern): If every cycle of
transitions in S complies with one of the following design
patterns: ε-Minimal Dwelling Time, ε-Alternating Cyber-
Value, or ε-Alternating Physical-Value, then ﬁnite-horizon
reachability model checking on the LHA set S is decidable.
Proof: See Appendix B in the supplementary ﬁle for detailed
deﬁnitions and proof. ￿
If we review the laser tracheotomy MDPnP online LHA
model (see Fig. 4(b) ∼ 8), we ﬁnd its design pattern complies
with Theorem 2. Hence online ﬁnite-horizon reachability
hybrid systems model checking (simpliﬁed as “online model
checking” in the following, unless explicitly denoted) on laser
tracheotomy MDPnP is decidable. That is, theoretically, a
worst case execution time bound for hard real-time exists.
4.2 Soft Real-Time System Design
Though online hard real-time model checking of SNZ-LHA-
Systems is theoretically possible due to Theorem 1, a tight
bound on worst case execution time is still an open problem.
A very loose bound is known (see [22]), but it is often too
large to be practical. In fact, we know the following:
Theorem 3: Finite-horizon reachability model checking of
an SNZ-LHA-System is NP-Hard.
Proof: See Appendix C in the supplementary ﬁle. ￿
Theorem 3 implies online hard real-time model checking
of SNZ-LHA-Systems is only practical for very small scale
cases; soft real-time online model checking instead has more
practical value.
In soft real-time online model checking, we directly specify
a desired deadline D, without requiring hard real-time guar-
antee. The selection method of D is empirical: as long as
D makes deadline misses satisfactorily rare and the online
modeling satisfactorily accurate. For example, we can use
standard benchmarks to ﬁnd a desirable D (see Section 5.2).
Even though deadline D may be missed, soft real-time
online model checking can still serve the MDPnP hybrid
system in at least two ways: one conservative and the other
aggressive, as described by the pseudo code in Fig. 10.
//Online model checking deadline is D = T
2 (see line 4, 6, 7, 11, 12).
1. main(mode){
2. wait till current time t satisﬁes (tmod T
2 = 0);
3. t0 := t;
4. read sensors and build online model A;
5. if (mode =“conservative way”){
6. if ((A may reach unsafe states in [t0,t0 + T])
7. or (current time t ≥ t0 + T
2 )){
8. /*non-blocking call:*/ switch the hybrid system to fall-back plan;
9. }else
/*non-blocking call:*/ allow the hybrid system to run normally;
10. else {//mode =“aggressive way”
11. if ((not (A may reach unsafe states in [t0,t0 + T]))
12. or (current time t ≥ t0 + T
2 )){
13. /*non-blocking call:*/ allow the hybrid system to run normally;
14. }else
/*non-blocking call:*/ switch the hybrid system to fall-back plan;
15. }
16. goto line 2;
17. }
Fig. 10. Revised overall system architecture that allows soft real-
time online model checking. Without loss of generality, the code runs a
pipeline with T = 2D (see line 2, 6, 11), where D = T
2 is the real-time
online model checking deadline. To “run normally” means that the hybrid
system runs according to online model A’s (see line 4) descriptions.
In the conservative way, if online model checking misses
deadline D, the MDPnP hybrid system always switches to the
(application dependent) fall-back plan. Assuming the modeling
is accurate, the conservative way can prevent all accidents.
However, if deadline misses are too often, the system will
frequently switch to fall-back plan, annoying the users. In
other words, the conservative way can raise a lots of false
alarms, but can prevent all accidents.
Take our laser tracheotomy MDPnP for example. Every time
the online model checking misses the D seconds deadline on
safety check, the supervisor will disapprove any laser emission
request for the next D seconds (i.e., the “fall-back plan”).
Instead, only when the online model checking conﬁrms safety
within the D seconds deadline will the supervisor follow
Fig. 8’s descriptions in the next D seconds.
In the aggressive way, if online model checking misses
deadline D, the MDPnP system does not switch to fall-back
plan. The aggressive way only invokes fall-back plan when it
is certain the system is facing risks. In other words, the aim
of aggressive way is not to prevent all accidents, but to reduce
accidents. In medical practice, a method that can signiﬁcantly
reduce accidents is still a useful method; in fact, most medical
routines are of such nature [23].IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 8
Again take our laser tracheotomy MDPnP for example.
Every time the online model checking misses the D seconds
deadline on safety check, the supervisor will nevertheless
follow Fig. 8’s descriptions in the next D seconds. The fall-
back plan (that the supervisor disapproves any laser emission
requests) only kicks in when online model checking is certain
that unsafe state is reachable within the D seconds deadline.
Therefore, the online model checking is not to eliminate all
possible accidents that a human surgeon may make, but to
reduce such accidents as an additional protection.
To summarize, each deadline miss means the online model
checking is uncertain about the safety of the MDPnP hybrid
system in the next D seconds. In the conservative way, the
system always switches to the fall-back plan when the online
model checking ends up uncertain (of course it also switches to
the fall-back plan when the online model checking is certain of
pending risks). In the aggressive way, the system only switches
to fall-back plan when the online model checking is certain of
pending risks.
5 EVALUATIONS
To validate our proposed approach, especially the effective-
ness (usefulness) of soft real-time online model checking for
MDPnP (the “conservative way” and the “aggressive way”,
see Section 4.2), we carry out evaluations using real-world
trachea/blood oxygen level traces.
5.1 Effectiveness
We run soft real-time online model checking program P (see
Fig. 10) upon emulated trachea/blood oxygen level sensors for
1200 seconds. We choose soft real-time deadline to be D = 2
seconds (see Section 5.2 for why). According to the soft real-
time pseudo code of Fig. 10, this means every D = T
2 =
2 seconds, P queries the emulated sensors for trachea/blood
oxygen level readings, then builds and veriﬁes an online model
with ﬁnite-horizon of T = 2D = 4 seconds.
We have two sets of 1200-second traces for the emulated
sensors. The ﬁrst set of 1200-second traces comes from Phys-
ioNet [24], a comprehensive online public database (set up by
NIH, NIBIB, and NIGMS) of real-world medical traces logged
by hospitals. For simplicity, we call it “PhysioNet Traces”.
The other set of 1200-second traces comes from our own
experiments on two human subjects. Human Subject 1 (HS1)
mimics the combined behavior of the supervisor, laser scalpel,
and surgeon in laser tracheotomy MDPnP. As shown by
Fig. 11(a), HS1 randomly swaps between holding the ﬂag of
“Laser Disapproved” and “Laser Approved”. Human Subject 2
(HS2) mimics the combined behavior of the ventilator and the
patient in the laser tracheotomy MDPnP. When HS1 holds the
“Laser Disapproved” ﬂag, HS2 breathes smoothly at the rate
of 6 seconds per respiration-cycle. When HS1 holds the “Laser
Approved” ﬂag, HS2 ﬁrst tries to exhale (to his very best) and
then holds his breath until HS1 raises the “Laser Disapproved”
ﬂag again (in case HS1 holds the “Laser Approved” ﬂag for
too long, HS2 is free to abort the experiment by resuming
normal breath). Meanwhile, HS2’s trachea and blood oxygen
(a)
(b)
Fig. 11. Human subjects roles and behaviors. (a) HS1; (b) HS2.
level are recorded by Nonin 9843 [19]. We call the derived
traces the “HKPolyU Traces”.
The two emulated sensors read corresponding real-world
traces (PhysioNet or HKPolyU) respectively. Based on the
readings, P builds online hybrid systems models as described
in Section 3.2, and veriﬁes it. The speciﬁc modeling and ver-
iﬁcation software used is PHAVer [18], a well-known hybrid
systems model checking tool. Our computation platform is a
Lenovo Thinkpad X201 with Intel Core i5 and 2.9G memory;
the OS is 32-bit Ubuntu 10.10.
For each trace, throughout its 1200-second emulation pe-
riod, program P carries out 1200/D = 1200/2 = 600 trials of
online modeling and veriﬁcations. The statistics of execution
time cost is depicted by Table 1.
The statistics show that more than 97.8% of the online
model checking trials ﬁnished within the D = 2 (sec) deadline.
In other words, only no more than 2.2% of the online model
checking trials missed deadline.
Assume the modeling is accurate (which is going to be
validated soon), in case P runs the “conservative way” (see
Fig. 10), the above result means not only all accidents are
prevented, the false alarm probability is no more than 2.2%.
In case P runs the “aggressive way”, the above result means
more than 97.8% of accidents can be reduced (every time the
system can reach unsafe states in the next D seconds, there is
a ≥ 97.8% chance that online model checking ﬁnishes within
deadline, hence triggering the fall-back plan). Such reduction
of accidents is signiﬁcant according to the standards of medical
practice [23]. In either case, the results provide strong evidence
that (soft) real-time online model checking is effective (i.e.,
feasible and useful).
TABLE 1
Statistics of execution time cost of online model checking (unit: second;
deadline D = 2 seconds)
% of trials Execution time of those
missed caught deadline (secs)
deadline Min Max Mean Std
PhysioNet Trace 2.2% 0.817 1.720 0.932 0.126
HKPolyU Trace 1.7% 0.818 1.940 0.965 0.146
To validate the assumption that the online modeling is
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oxygen level curve.
During the online model checking, at every time instance
t0 = kD (k ∈ {0,1,...,599}, and D = 2 seconds), we
sample the blood oxygen level and predict (see Fig. 4) the
blood oxygen level curve in [t0,t0+T] (T = 2D = 4 seconds).
Let the predicted blood oxygen level at time (t0 + T) be
g SpO2(t0 + T). Let the PhysioNet/HKPolyU trace reading of
blood oxygen level at time (t0 + T) be d SpO2(t0 + T). We
deﬁne the relative prediction error at time (t0 + T) to be
ERRSpO2(t0 + T) =
| d SpO2(t0 + T) − g SpO2(t0 + T)|
d SpO2(t0 + T)
.
The statistics of the relative prediction errors throughout
the 600 trials for each trace are depicted by Table 2. The
statistics show that our online model checking’s predictions
on the ﬁnite-horizon behavior of blood oxygen level curve
match the real-world traces quite accurately (with maximum
relative error of 3.92%).
TABLE 2
Statistics of blood oxygen level online modeling relative errors (%)
Min Max Mean Std
PhysioNet Trace 0.03 2.53 0.51 0.52
HKPolyU Trace < 0.01 3.92 0.61 0.60
5.2 Selection of Soft Real-Time Online Model Check-
ing Deadline
Now we show why D = 2 seconds is an empirically desirable
soft real-time online model checking deadline for the pseudo
code of Fig. 10.
We use both the 1200-second PhysioNet Trace and the
1200-second HKPolyU Trace as benchmark, and try out
different values of D.
Table 3 shows the statistics on online modeling relative
errors under different Ds. The statistics show that D = 2
seconds incurs least maximum relative error compared to other
candidates. Note D = 2 seconds might not be the optimal
choice, but based on the evaluations on the 2400-second
medical traces, it turns out to be an empirically effective
choice. A lot of parameters used in medicine are derived from
such empirical studies.
TABLE 3
Online Model Checking Relative Error Statistics under Different Ds
Trace D(sec) Relative Error (%)
Min Max Mean Std
2 0.03 2.53 0.51 0.52
PhysioNet 3 0.04 4.52 0.76 0.74
4 < 0.01 5.98 0.96 0.94
2 < 0.01 3.92 0.61 0.60
HKPolyU 3 < 0.01 4.81 0.90 0.90
4 < 0.01 6.29 1.18 1.12
6 DISCUSSIONS
6.1 False Negatives and False Positives
If the online model is absolutely accurate, the online model
checking either misses deadline, or produces true-positive/true-
negative conclusions.
Interestingly, even if the online model is inaccurate, i.e.,
if the online model checking can produce false-positive/false-
negative conclusions, our proposed method can still be useful
for medical practices. Please see Appendix D in the supple-
mentary ﬁle for details.
6.2 Wireless Communications Links
So far, we have assumed reliable communications links be-
tween entities. Though this assumption is empirically valid
for wired communications links, it is not for wireless.
How to adopt unreliable wireless communications links in
life/safety critical medical settings is a nontrivial and active
research area [25][26][27][28]. A comprehensive solution is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can still provide
a simple hybrid solution to allow wireless links between the
sensors and the supervisor. Our solution is as follows.
According to the pseudo code of Fig. 10, every D seconds,
the sensors are supposed to update the supervisor with the new
readings of the patient’s vital sign(s). Suppose at time instance
iD (i ∈ Z≥0), the corresponding reading is Xi. Suppose
at time instance iD, the supervisor needs to look at Xi−k,
Xi−k+1, ..., Xi to build the online model. If any reading(s)
of Xi−k ∼ Xi is(are) lost due to wireless communications
failures, then for the period of [iD,(i + 1)D], the supervisor
shall refuse to carry out online model checking, to cause a
deliberate “deadline miss”. This deliberately created deadline
miss shall then be treated as a usual deadline miss.
In this way, any wireless communications failures will only
result in more deadline misses. The designs and analysis de-
scribed in the previous sections (and subsections) still sustain.
For further evaluations of this wireless approach, please
refer to Appendix E of the supplementary ﬁle.
7 RELATED WORK
Our approach is different from the well-known runtime ver-
iﬁcation [29]. Runtime veriﬁcation aims to discover latent
bugs of programs by logging and analyzing the programs’
execution traces under varied inputs/conﬁgurations. It is not
for predicting/preventing faults before they ever happen;
whilst our approach is. For many medical CPS systems, the
cost/consequence of possible faults in test runs is high or even
unbearable. This necessitates our approach of predicting and
preventing faults before they ever happen.
Sen et al. [30] propose an online safety analysis method for
multithreaded programs. However, this work only focuses on
how to infer other potential executions that can take place in
the past. Our work tries to predict the future state of patient
based on recent observations
Easwaran et al. [31], Qi et al. [32], and Harel et al. [33]
also propose bringing model checking online. But they are still
focusing on discrete (automata) model checking, rather than
hybrid systems model checking that this paper is about.IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 10
Sauter et al. [34] propose a lightweight hybrid-system model
checking method, which uses ordinary differential equations
(ODE) to predict temporal logic properties However, in the
MDPnP systems it is not uncommon to be lack of differential
equations governing patients dynamics, i.e., patients model.
Li et al. [35] propose one online model checking approach
aiming at automatically estimating parameters in simulation
models, which are often used for biological purpose to under-
stand complex regulatory mechanisms in cell.
Larsen et al. [36] propose an online model-based testing
tool for real-time systems, UPPAAL TRON. The tool is based
on UPPAAL engine and models real-time systems as timed
automata, whereas our online model checking of MDPnP
systems focuses on more general hybrid systems.
Also, our approach is not model-checker speciﬁc, though
our evaluation in this paper uses PHAVer. In fact, we are
considering integrating our approach with other well-known
model checkers, such as Bogor [37], CellExcite [38] etc..
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Through our case study on laser tracheotomy MDPnP, we
show that online model checking of short-run future behavior
can effectively address the two challenges in MDPnP CPS
hybrid systems model checking. By focusing on online and
short-run future, many originally hard to describe/predict
human body parameters become describable and predictable;
and many variable parameters become ﬁxed numerical val-
ues, which greatly simpliﬁes veriﬁcation. The online model
checking can go real-time if the proposed hard/soft real-
time system co-design patterns are followed. Our empirical
evaluations based on real-world human subject traces show
that our online model checking and co-design approach is
feasible and effective. As future work, we will carry out
more evaluations and integrate/extend our approach to more
comprehensive MDPnP/CPS frameworks [39][40][41][42].
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APPENDIX A
DECIDABILITY
This section gives a proof for the decidability of SNZ-LHA
system. Though [1] gives a guideline for proof, to our best
knowledge, a formal proof is still missing in the literature.
We therefore give a formal proof in the following.
The proof involves heavy usage of symbols. Due to space
limit, we are not going to explicitly re-deﬁne each symbol,
instead, readers shall refer to [2] for the deﬁnitions of the
corresponding symbols.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the following concepts:
Deﬁnition 1: We say trajectory τ is from hybrid automaton
state (v,σ) to a state space χ, denoted as (v,σ)  τ χ, iff
τ(0,0) = (v,σ) and τ(h,δh) ∈ χ, where h =  τ  is the
number of hops of τ.
For a ﬁnite-horizon model checking problem on whether
σ |= ϕ1∃U≤Tϕ2, we can use the well-known SMC-procedure
proposed in [2]. To prove the decidability of SNZ-LHA
system, we only need to prove SMC-procedure has limited
iterations for our case.
Let us ﬁrst prove the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: In SMC-procedure reachability model check-
ing, if automaton state (v,σ) ∈ χi\χi−1 (see Section 5.1
of [2] for the deﬁnition of χi), then ∀τ, if (v,σ)  τ χ0,
then  τ  ≥ ⌊ i
2⌋.
Proof: Suppose there is a trajectory τ, s.t. (v,σ)  τ χ0 and
h =  τ  < ⌊ i
2⌋.
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Note τ can be denoted as τ = (v0,δ0,ρ0) → (v1,δ1,ρ1) →
... → (vh,δh,ρh), which consists of h transitions be-
tween (h + 1) v-trajectories, and (v0,ρ0(0)) = (v,σ) and
(vh,ρh(δh)) ∈ χ0.
Since in each iteration of SMC-procedure, all predecessor
regions within one v-trajectory or within one transition is
included, it hence takes no more than (2h + 1) iterations
for SMC-procedure to include state (v,σ). Meanwhile, h <
⌊ i
2⌋ ⇒ h ≤ ⌊ i
2⌋ − 1 ⇒ 2h + 1 ≤ 2(⌊ i
2⌋ − 1) + 1 ≤
2( i
2 − 1) + 1 = i − 1. This means (v,σ) ∈ χi−1, which
contradicts (v,σ) ∈ χi\χi−1. ￿
Lemma 2: Let A be an SNZ-LHA system. Then for any
trajectory τ in A, the trajectory duration δτ ≥
j
 τ 
 E +1
k
ε,
where  τ  is the hop length of τ,  E  is the number of
transitions of A, and ε is deﬁned in the deﬁnition of SNZ-
LHA system.
Proof: Due to the well-known pigeonhole principle, for every
sub-trajectory τ′ of τ, if  τ′  ≥  E  + 1, then τ′ must
have passed at least one cycle of transitions in A. Therefore,
trajectory τ must have passed at least
j
 τ 
 E +1
k
cycles of
transitions in A without temporal overlapping. According to
the theorem of SNZ-LHA system decidability, every cycle of
transitions takes at least ε seconds to pass, the lemma hence
holds. ￿
Lemma 3: Suppose the LHA system only consists of one
LHA A. Let I = 2(⌈T
ε ⌉+1)( E +1)+1, where T is the
ﬁnite-horizon for ﬁnite-horizon reachability model check-
ing, ε is deﬁned in the deﬁnition of SNZ-LHA system,
and  E  is the number of transitions in A, then the SMC-
procedure on model checking ﬁnite-horizon reachability
terminates at the (I + 1)th iteration.
Proof: Suppose there is automaton state (v,σ) ∈ χI+1\χI,
then ∀τ.(v,σ)  τ χ0, we have
 τ  ≥ ⌊
I + 1
2
⌋ (due to Lemma 1),IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 2
then trajectory duration
δτ ≥
￿
 τ 
 E  + 1
￿
ε (due to Lemma 2)
≥
$
⌊I+1
2 ⌋
 E  + 1
%
ε =
$
⌊
2(⌈ T
ε ⌉+1)( E +1)+2
2 ⌋
 E  + 1
%
ε
=
$
⌊(⌈T
ε ⌉ + 1)( E  + 1) + 1⌋
 E  + 1
%
ε
≥
$
(⌈T
ε ⌉ + 1)( E  + 1)
 E  + 1
%
ε =
￿
⌈
T
ε
⌉ + 1
￿
ε
≥
￿
T
ε
+ 1
￿
ε >
T
ε
ε = T.
This violates the assumption that ϕ1 and ϕ2 already include
the requirement that global time t ∈ [0,T] for the case of
ﬁnite-horizon reachability model checking. Hence χI+1\χI =
∅, which means SMC-procedure terminates at the (I + 1)th
iteration. ￿
With the above deﬁnitions and lemmas, we can now prove
the decidability of SNZ-LHA system:
Because the LHAs in the system can be combined into a
single LHA within polynomial time [2], and the resulted LHA
A still satisﬁes the preconditions of SNZ-LHA system, hence
the theorem holds due to Lemma 3. ￿
APPENDIX B
DECIDABLE DESIGN PATTERN
To describe these patterns, however, we need the following
two concepts.
Deﬁnition 2 (Cycle of Transitions): Given a hybrid au-
tomaton A = (  x,  x0,V,v0,inv,dif,E,act,L,syn), a cy-
cle of transitions is a sequence of e0v0e1v1 ...ek−1vk−1e0,
where ei ∈ E, vi ∈ V , and ei = (v((i−1) mod k),vi)
(i = 0,1,...,k − 1).
Deﬁnition 3 (Minimal Dwelling Time): Given a hybrid au-
tomaton A = (  x,  x0,V,v0,inv,dif,E,act,L,syn), a lo-
cation v ∈ V has minimal dwelling time of ε iff for any
trajectory τ that enters v via a transition, τ must stay in
v for at least ε time before being able to leave v via a
transition.
With the above concepts, we can describe the following
design patterns, assuming S denotes a set of LHAs.
Deﬁnition 4 (ε-Minimal Dwelling Time Pattern): Given a
cycle of transitions C, if there is at least one location v in
C, s.t. v has a minimal dwelling time of ε, then C complies
with ε-Minimal Dwelling Time pattern.
Example 1: The supervisor hybrid automaton (see Fig. 8 of
the main ﬁle) has a cycle of transitions C1 = “eventSuperviso-
rApprove LaserApproved eventNormalDisapprove LaserDis-
approved eventSupervisorApprove”. Since all transitions enter-
ing location LaserDisapproved sets tdisapprove to 0; while all
transitions that leaves LaserDisapproved requires tdisapprove ≥
Tmin
disapprove. We assume Tmin
disapprove is a positive constant,
then LaserDisapproved has minimal dwelling time of ε =
Tmin
disapprove > 0. As LaserDisapproved is in C1, C1 hence
complies with ε-Minimal Dwelling Time pattern. ￿
Deﬁnition 5 (ε-Alternating Cyber-Value Pattern): Given a
set S of LHAs, and suppose LHA A ∈ S has a cycle of
transitions C = e0v0e1v1 ...ek−1vk−1e0. If there are two
transitions ei, ej (i,j ∈ {0,1,...,k − 1}) in C, s.t.
1) (i < j) ∨ ((i  = 0) ∧ (j = 0));
2) to trigger ei, a state variable xl ∈   x must ﬁrst
perform a discrete value switch from s to s′ (possibly
by another automaton in S);
3) to trigger ej, the same xl must equal s;
4) xl does not change value within any locations (i.e.,
it only changes during transitions).
5) s  = s′, and all transitions in S that can switch xl
from s to s′ enter target locations with a minimal
dwelling time of ε.
then C complies with ε-Alternating Cyber-Value pattern.
Example 2: In the ventilator hybrid automaton (see Fig. 6 of
the main ﬁle), there is a cycle of transitions C2 = “eventVen-
tResume PumpOut eventVentToHold PumpIn eventVentHold
Hold eventVentResume”. Note that to trigger eventVentRe-
sume, LaserApprove must be ﬁrst switched from true to
false; and to trigger eventVentHold, LaserApprove must
equal true. LaserApprove is a computer logic (i.e., cyber-
) variable that does not change in any locations. Plus, all
transitions that set LaserApprove from true to false enter
the LaserDisapproved location (see Fig. 8 of the main ﬁle),
which has a minimal dwelling time of ε = Tmin
disapprove, where
Tmin
disapprove is a positive constant. This implies C2 complies
with ε-Alternating Cyber-Value pattern. ￿
Deﬁnition 6 (ε-Alternating Physical-Value Pattern):
Given a cycle of transitions C, if there are two transitions
ei, ej in C, s.t.
1) to trigger ei, a state variable xl ∈   x must equal s;
2) to trigger ej, the same xl must equal s′;
3) s  = s′, and xl represent a physical world parameter,
whose value can only change continuously, and there
is an upper bound R > 0 on |˙ xl|, s.t.,
2|s−s
′|
R ≥ ε.
then C complies with ε-Alternating Cyber-Value pattern.
Example 3: In the ventilator hybrid automaton (see Fig. 6 of
the main ﬁle), there is a cycle of transitions C3 = “eventVent-
PumpOut PumpOut eventVentPumpIn PumpIn eventVent-
PumpOut”. To trigger eventVentPumpOut, state variable Hvent
must equal 0.3(m); while to trigger eventVentPumpIn, Hvent
must equal 0(m). Meanwhile, as Hvent represents a physical
world parameter: the current height of ventilator cynlinder.
Its value can only change continuously, and the change rate
is bounded by | ˙ Hvent| = 0.1(m/sec). Therefore, to change
from 0.3(m) to 0(m) and back to 0.3(m), it takes at least
2|0.3(m)−0(m)|/0.1(m/sec) = 6(sec). Therefore C3 compliesIEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 3
with ε-Alternating Physical-Value pattern, where we can pick
ε = 6(sec). ￿
Proof of Theorem 2 of the Main File: If trajectory τ passes
through a transition twice, then it passes through a cycle of
transitions C. Given C must comply with one of the following
patterns:
Case 1: ε-Minimal Dwelling Time pattern, then τ must
stayed in one location on C for more than ε.
Case 2: ε-Alternating Cyber-Value pattern, then τ must have
changed a state variable xl’s value from s to s′ and back to s,
where xl, s, and s′ are described in Deﬁnition 5. According
to Deﬁnition 5, this costs at least ε amount of time.
Case 3: ε-Alternating Physical-Value pattern, then τ must
have changed a state variable xl’s value from s to s′ and
back to s, where xl, s, and s′ are described in Deﬁnition 6.
According to Deﬁnition 6, since xl is continuous and |˙ xl| ≤ R,
altering xl from s to s′ and back to s takes at least
2|s−s
′|
R ≥ ε
amount of time.
In summary, there must be δτ ≥ ε. Therefore, S is
SNZ-LHA-System, and hence is decidable for ﬁnite-horizon
reachability model checking. ￿
APPENDIX C
NP-HARDNESS OF SNZ-LHA SYSTEM
We can reduce the well-known NP-Hard problem of Directed
Hamiltonian Cycle to the problem of ﬁnite-horizon reachabil-
ity model checking of an SNZ-LHA-System.
The Directed Hamiltonian Cycle problem is as follows:
Given a directed graph G = (VG,EG), where VG and EG
are its vertex set and directed edge set respectively, does
G contain a directed Hamiltonian cycle?
Given an instance of Directed Hamiltonian Cycle problem
PG on directed graph G = (VG,EG), we can construct an
SNZ-LHA-System A = (  x,  x0,V,v0,inv,dif,E,act,L,syn)
in polynomial time, where
V = VG, i.e., each vertex in G is regarded as a location in A.
Denote n = |V | = |VG|, and hence denote V = VG = {vi},
where i = 1,2,...,n.
E = EG, i.e., each edge in G is regarded as an edge in A.
  x = (x1,x2,...,xn,t), i.e., we assign a variable xi for
each vi ∈ V = VG (where i = 1,2,...,n); and t is a timer
for ﬁxed dwelling time guarantee, which will be explained
later.
  x0 = (0,0,...,0), i.e., xi (where i = 1,2,...,n) and t are
all initialized to 0.
v0 can be any location. Without loss of generality, let us
pick v0 = v1.
For each vi ∈ V (where i = 1,2,...,n), inv(vi) corre-
sponds to the inequality proposition of
0 ≤ t < 1. (1)
For each vi ∈ V (where i = 1,2,...,n), dif(vi) corre-
sponds to the following continuous activities:
˙ xi = 1,
˙ xk = 0, for each k  = i and k ∈ {1,2,...,n}
˙ t = 1. (2)
For each edge e = (vi,vj) ∈ E (where i,j ∈ {1,2,...,n}),
act(e) corresponds to the following discrete actions:
t = 1, (3)
t′ = 0. (4)
Formulae (3), (4), (1), and (2) together imply every location
v ∈ V has a ﬁxed dwelling time of 1: once entered, one
has to stay exactly 1 unit of time, and then move to another
location. This further implies LHA A complies with the ǫ-
Minimal Dwelling Time Pattern, where ǫ = 1. According to
Theorem of decidable design pattern, LHA A henceforth is a
SNZ-LHA-System.
Finally, we choose L = ∅ and syn = ∅ as they are
irrelevant to our proof.
With SNZ-LHA-System A at hand, our ﬁnite-horizon SNZ-
LHA-System reachability model checking problem PA checks
whether the following state space S is reachable within ﬁnite-
horizon T = n + 1:
S = {(v1,  x)|where 1.5 < x1 < 2,
and 0.5 < xi ≤ 1 for each i = 2,3,...,n}.
A “yes” answer to PA implies there is a cyclic trajectory
on A that traverse each vertex v ∈ V exactly once and
returns to the initial location of v1. This trajectory hence
corresponds to a Hamiltonian Cycle in G, hence a “yes”
answer to PG. Conversely, a “yes” answer to PG implies there
is a Hamiltonian Cycle in G, along this cycle, we can traverse
A to reach S, hence a “yes” answer to PA.
From above, we prove Directed Hamiltonian Cycle problem
can be reduced to ﬁnite-horizon reachability model checking
of an SNZ-LHA-System problem in polynomial time. As Di-
rected Hamiltonian Cycle problem is NP-Hard, ﬁnite-horizon
reachability model checking of an SNZ-LHA-System problem
is hence NP-Hard. ￿
APPENDIX D
FALSE NEGATIVES AND FALSE POSITIVES DE-
TAILED DISCUSSIONS
For ease of narration, we call our proposed online model
checking based MDPnP practice as “MDPnP-practice”; call
the corresponding online modeling and online model check-
ing as “MDPnP-online-modeling” and “MDPnP-online-model-
checking” respectively.
Still take the laser tracheotomy for example, Table 1 lists all
possible cases for “MDPnP-practice”. We see that the upper
bounds of accident probability are
Pcons
m = p(+)pm(−|+) (5)
and Paggr
m = p(+)[pm(−|+) + pm(?|+)] (6)
respectively for “conservative mode” and “aggressive mode”,
where p(+) is the probability to reach unsafe states under theIEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 4
absolutely accurate patient model (i.e. the patient model in
“God’s view”, rather than the model described by Fig. 4 of
the main ﬁle); pm(−|+), pm(?|+) are respectively the con-
ditional probability that MDPnP-online-model-checking gives
“negative” answer (i.e., a false-negative answer), or misses
deadline (i.e., cannot give a deterministic answer). Note false-
positive is not a big concern as it will trigger fall-back plan,
leaving no chances for accidents (though may be a nuisance
to the surgeon).
TABLE 1
All Possible Cases for MDPnP Practice
Reality Online-Model-
Checking Result
What Happens Accident
Possible?
positive scenario 1 No
positive negative scenario 2 Yes
deadline scenario 1 (cons) No
miss scenario 2 (aggr) Yes
negative no need to care no need to care No
positive: unsafe states are reachable.
negative: unsafe states are not reachable.
scenario 1: fall-back plan kicks in, which forbids use of laser and keeps
ventilator on; the worst case is that the surgeon may be annoyed.
scenario 2: the system run as what Fig. 4, 6, 7, 8 of the main ﬁle describe.
In comparison to MDPnP-practice, now let us study the
current-practice (i.e., the actual practice in nowadays hospi-
tals) of laser tracheotomy.
First, the role of supervisor (i.e. the procedure described in
Fig. 8 of the main ﬁle) is taken over by a human-supervisor.
Usually, the human-supervisor is the surgeon himself/herself;
but for clarity, let us differentiate the two persons.
Second, as for line 4 of the algorithm described in Fig. 10 of
the main ﬁle, instead of MDPnP-online-modeling, the human-
supervisor uses his/her subjective judgement to model the
patient in the near future (e.g., replace   ˙ SpO2(t0) in Fig. 4
of the main ﬁle with his/her subjective prediction). We call
this “subjective-online-modeling”.
Third, as for line 6 and 11 of the algorithm described
in Fig. 10 of the main ﬁle, instead of MPnP-online-model-
checking, the human-supervisor uses his subjective judgement
to decide whether unsafe states are reachable. We call this
“subjective-online-model-checking”.
Therefore, reusing the same analysis on the MDPnP-
practice, we can derive the upper bounds of accident prob-
ability for the current-practice:
Pcons
c = p(+)ps(−|+) (7)
and Paggr
c = p(+)[ps(−|+) + ps(?|+)] (8)
respectively for “conservative mode” and “aggressive mode”,
where ps(−|+), ps(?|+) are respectively the conditional prob-
ability that subjective-online-model-checking gives “negative”
answer (i.e., a false-negative answer), or misses deadline (i.e.,
cannot give a deterministic answer).
Suppose we adopt the “conservative mode”. By comparing
Equation (5) and (7), we see the MDPnP-practice is safer than
the current-practice when
pm(−|+) ≤ ps(−|+). (9)
How to mathematically verify Inequality (9) is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, we can still verify empirically.
For example, if some well-established math model for pre-
dicting patient near-future behavior exists [3], then we’d better
use MDPnP-online-modeling rather than relying on subjective-
online-modeling. Or, we can carry out comparison using well-
known benchmark patient traces, to see which online-modeling
is more trustworthy.
The same thing is for “aggressive mode”, except that
Inequality (9) now becomes
pm(−|+) + pm(?|+) ≤ ps(−|+) + ps(?|+). (10)
APPENDIX E
WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LINKS DETAILED
DISCUSSIONS
To evaluate the method proposed in Section 6.2 of the main
ﬁle, we redo the evaluations of Section 5.1 of the main ﬁle to
redraw its Table 1 and 2. All other settings are the same except
that we consider the link between the oximeter and supervisor
to be a wireless link.
The wireless link is unreliable, therefore packets carrying
blood oxygen level readings may be lost. The packet losses
are treated with the method proposed in Section 6.2 of the
main ﬁle. The results are summarized in Table 2 and 3 of
this supplementary ﬁle. These two tables respectively replace
Table 1 and 2 of Section 5.1 of the main ﬁle.
The results show that with packet loss rate of ≤ 3%, both
the deadline miss rates and the relative errors are moderately
low. Hence even with the unreliable wireless link, we can still
carry out online hybrid model checking.
Note with the new advancements in medical grade wireless
communications technology, it is possible to control wireless
link packet loss rate to below 1%, or even 0.1% [4][5].
TABLE 2
Statistics of execution time cost of online model checking (unit: second;
deadline D = 2 seconds)
Packet % of trials Execution time of those
loss missed caught deadline (secs)
rate deadline Min Max Mean Std
PhysioNet 1% 5.034% 0.817 1.720 0.932 0.124
Trace 2% 6.387% 0.817 1.720 0.932 0.125
3% 11.429% 0.817 1.720 0.929 0.124
HKPolyU 1% 4.690% 0.818 1.940 0.964 0.147
Trace 2% 6.030% 0.818 1.940 0.964 0.146
3% 11.725% 0.818 1.940 0.966 0.149
TABLE 3
Statistics of blood oxygen level online modeling relative errors (%)
Packet Min Max Mean Std
loss rate
PhysioNet 1% < 0.01 2.529 0.512 0.526
Trace 2% < 0.01 2.529 0.510 0.523
3% < 0.01 2.529 0.503 0.526
HKPolyU 1% < 0.01 3.918 0.602 0.602
Trace 2% < 0.01 3.918 0.600 0.606
3% < 0.01 3.918 0.591 0.608IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PARALLEL AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 5
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